St. John's Law Review
Volume 40
Number 1 Volume 40, December 1965, Number
1

Article 51

CPLR 3103: Inapplicable to CPLR 3123 in Advance of Trial
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 40

Massachusetts, requested that the place of an EBT be changed
to Massachusetts and, in addition, that plaintiff and co-defendant
pay his attorney's expenses. The court denied these requests 190
since defendant Aronson was subject to examination in New York
as a party to the action pursuant to CPLR 3110(1), and since
there were no unusual circumstances present which would work
a hardship on him. 91 However, the court did require reimbursement to defendant of his travel expenses incurred in attending
the EBT since he neither stood in the shoes of a plaintiff nor
interposed a counterclaim. That this was ordered by the court
on its own initiative is not unusual since implied authority is
provided therefor in CPLR 3101(a).
CPLR 3103: Inapplicable to CPLR 3123 in advance of trial.
In Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 9 2 defendant
sought a protective order' 93 so as not to be required to answer
questions in plaintiff's notice to admit.2'9
The court in denying
defendant's motion held that CPLR 3103 was inapplicable to CPLR
3123 in advance of trial. It stated that 3123 is virtually a reenactment of CPA § 322 and that the cases interpreting the latter
section precluded an attack on a notice to admit. 195 Therefore,
the court reasoned that the same conclusion would have to be
reached under the CPLR.9'0 It would appear from an examination
of 3103(a) that a strong argument can be made for granting a
protective order to prevent the testing of a notice to admit in
advance of trial.:"" The subdivision is broadly worded:
The court may at any time . . . make a protective order denying,
limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. 98
Such wording would not appear to warrant the unequivocal statement made by the court that 3103 does not permit such an attack
upon a notice to admit. On the contrary, the language of 3103 (a)
190 CPLR 3110(1) renders any party to an action subject to examination
"where the action is pending."
291 CPLR 3103 (a) governs such situations.
.19246 Misc. 2d 202, 259 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
'93 The protective order was sought pursuant to CPLR 3103.
194 Plaintiff's notice to admit had been served pursuant to CPLR 3123.
o As authority for this statement, the court cited Belfer v. Dictograph
Prods., Inc., 275 App. Div. 824, 89 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1949), and
Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 270 App. Div. 700, 62 N.Y.S.2d 440
(4th Dep't 1946), aff'd without opinion, 296 N.Y. 1014, 72 N.E2d 723

(1947).
196.See 3 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEw YoRK Cvx
PAcricE 3123.09
(1964).
194See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3123, supp. commentary 41 (1965).
29 8CPLR 3103(a).
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would appear to call for some qualification by the court with
respect to such a pervasive holding. With respect to the contention that there is authority in the Advisory Committee's Report
for granting the protective order, it would appear that the court
in rejecting such contention reasoned to a logical conclusion.
There is in fact (as the court noted) 1 9 nothing contained in the
report which would support such a contention. 20 0 Thus the (apparently) broad language of the statute was given a narrow interpretation because of the expressed intention of the Advisory
Committee. This conflict is one which should be resolved by the
legislature-whether it will choose to do so and prevent the
apparent injustice which may result from the holding in the instant
case is quite another matter.
CPLR 3121(a): Physical condition need not be placed "at issue"
by pleadings in order to examine hospital records.
In Fisher v. Fossett,201 the scope of disclosure available under
CPLR 3121(a) was clarified. The section permits the service
of a notice on any party to submit to a physical or mental examination, when that party's condition is in controversy. Defendant's car struck plaintiff's house. An official accident report
which defendant had signed stated that "driver blacked out [and]
struck house. . .

."

Plaintiff moved for an order to compel dis-

closure of an examination report contained in certain hospital
records pursuant to 3121(a), and defendant sought a 3122 protective order in opposition to such motion.
In denying defendant's protective order, the court held that
the failure to raise the issue of defendant's physical condition in
the pleadings would not warrant the preclusion of the right to
examine hospital records. It stated that 3121(a) only requires
that the party's condition be in controversy-not at issue. The
court also stated that the primary question at the trial will be
the defendant's physical condition and whether or not the condition
would excuse what would otherwise constitute negligence.
If there is any difference between something being "at issue"
or "in controversy" it is one which is very slight. However slight
that distinction may be, the court's holding stresses a broad interpretation of CPLR 3121(a).

19 9 Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 46 Misc. 2d 202, 204, 259
N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1965).
200 FIRST RPp. 154.
20145 Misc. 2d 757, 257 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct Erie County 1965).

